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ABSTRACT   
Previous research has suggested that the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) supports judgments of social 
distance, with greater activity observed in response to targets judged to be closer to each other 
(Yamakawa, Kanai, Matsumura, & Naito, 2009). Amongst other stimuli, activity in the IPS 
appears to be responsive to targets varying in social status (Chiao et al., 2009; Cloutier, 
Ambady, Meagher, & Gabrieli, 2012). The current project examined brain responses during 
explicit self-referential social status judgments of targets varying in either financial or moral 
status. Using an event-related fMRI design, participants viewed photographs of male faces 
paired with distinct levels of financial or moral status. During the task, participants were asked to 
explicitly identify each target’s status in relation to their own. Focusing on IPS activity, results 
from whole-brain and region of interest analyses revealed an interaction between social status 
types and levels. The implications of these results are discussed with respect to our current 
understanding of the impact of social status on the neural substrates of person perception. 
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RESUMEN    
Investigación previa ha sugerido que el surco intraparietal (IPS) respalda juicios de distancia 
social, con mayor actividad observada en respuesta a objetivos juzgados para estar más cerca 
de otros (Yamakawa, Kanai, Matsumura, & Naito, 2009). Entre otros estímulos, la actividad en el 
surco intraparietal parece ser receptiva a objetivos variando en estatus sociales (Chiao et al., 
2009; Cloutier, Ambady, Meagher, & Gabrieli, 2012). El presente proyecto examinó las 
respuestas cerebrales durante juicios de estatus sociales auto-referenciales de objetivos 
variando tanto en estatus morales como financieros. Usando un diseño de resonancia 
magnética asociada a evento, los participantes observaron fotografías de rostros masculinos 
emparejadas con distintos niveles de estatus financieros o morales. Durante la tarea, se les 
pidió a los participantes identificar explícitamente el estatus de cada objetivo en relación al de 
ellos. Enfocándose en la actividad del surco intraparietal, los resultados de los análisis del 
cerebro entero y de regiones de interés revelaron una interacción entre los tipos y niveles de 
estatus sociales. Las implicaciones de estos resultados son discutidas con respecto a nuestro 
entendimiento actual del impacto del estatus social en los substratos neuronales de la 
percepción de las personas. 
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Hierarchies are omnipresent in a wide range 
of social organizations and appear to shape much of 
the social lives of many species; from ants, fish, and 
birds (Grosenick, Clement, & Fernald, 2007; 
Tinbergen, 1936; Wilson, 2000), to non-human 
primates and humans (Cheney & Seyfarth; 2008; 
Fiske 2010; Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 
2007). Human hierarchies influence social behavior 
within professional, domestic, and recreational social 
settings (Cummins, 2000). These formal and informal 
hierarchies are believed to serve two broad sets of 
functions: 1) they provide social roles guiding the 
behavior of group members,  which in turn facilitate 
order, coordination, and interactions, and 2) they 
incentivize those at the bottom of the hierarchy to 
progress and achieve higher relative standings 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Flynn, Reagans, 
Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Hogg, 2001; Huberman, Loch, & Önccüler, 
2004; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). 
Across species, individuals of relatively higher 
social status tend to have privileged access to 
precious resources (i.e., food, territory, and mates) 
and greater reproductive success (Ellis, 1993; Fiske, 
1992; Fiske, 2010). Social status has also been linked 
to increased wellbeing, better health, and lower 
morbidity rates (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & Ickovics, 
2000; Boyce, 2004; Sapolsky, 2004, 2005). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that humans possessing higher 
status are generally believed to be evaluated more 
positively and to enjoy greater prestige (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Flynn et al., 2006; 
Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; but see Cloutier, Ambady, 
Meagher, & Gabrieli, 2012). 
Thus, in order to successfully navigate the 
complexities intrinsic to the multitude of social groups 
to which an individual belongs, one benefits from 
possessing knowledge of the relative ranks of other 
group members (Fiske, 1992; Fiske, 2010; Wilson, 
2000). In many instances, status cues can be visually 
identified; this is the case with the size of ants and 
bees (Wilson, 2000) and a variety of dominance-
related cues displayed by non-human primates 
(Cheney & Seyfarth; 2008; Hare & Tomasello, 2004). 
However, humans can also infer social status from a 
range of socially valued dimensions that may not 
always be perceptually identifiable, such as the 
financial resources or moral character of others 
(Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Boehm 2012; Fiske, 
2010; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 
2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  
Whether others’ social status is accessible 
from perceptually available cues or prior knowledge 
(e.g., information conveying financial or moral 
standing), perceivers may be spontaneously mapping 
the distance between their status and that of others in 
order to represent the relative rank of group members 
(Cloutier, et al., 2012). Previous research has defined 
social distance (Festinger, 1954; Wheeler, 1966) in 
terms of the similarity between the self and others, the 
degree of perceived reciprocity in social interactions, 
or the level of explicit prejudice held towards out-
group members (Akerlof, 1997, Bogardus, 1959, 
Henry & Hardin, 2006; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 
1996; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Magee, & 
Smith, 2013). The ability to assess relative social 
distances is believed to be an important aspect of 
social intelligence, which can be defined as an 
individual’s capacity to navigate and manage daily 
interactions with others and social environments more 
generally (Frith & Wolpert, 2004; Goleman, 2006). For 
example, it has been found that minimizing the social 
distance between two participants favors increased 
cooperative behavior in the context of dictator and 
ultimatum games, two tasks that examine participants’ 
inclination to share valuable resources (Charness & 
Gneezy, 2008; Hoffman et al., 1996; Jones & Rachlin, 
2006). In contrast, when primed with the concept of 
financial resources (i.e., money), participants show a 
tendency to increase the social distance between 
themselves and others (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that 
hierarchical differentiations among individuals varying 
in social status may indeed rely on spontaneous 
assessments of social distances (see Chiao et al., 
2009; Chiao, Bordeaux, & Ambady, 2004). 
Additionally, across a variety of cultural 
contexts, social relationships tend to be discussed as 
if they belonged to a physical space. This is 
exemplified by expressions such as “close friends” or 
“distant relatives” (Bottero & Prandy, 2003; Ossowski, 
1963). Such expressions are also commonly used 
when referring to an individual’s or a group’s social 
status, such as “those who are at the top or at the 
bottom of a ladder or hierarchy.”  Interestingly, a 
region of the parietal cortex, demonstrated to be 
involved in the representation of numerical 
magnitudes (Cohen-Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, 
Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & 
Cohen, 2003; Pinel, Dehaene, Riviere, & LeBihan, 
2001; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; 
Shuman & Kanwisher, 2004), may also support the 
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assessment of social distances. From this 
perspective, the mental representations of numbers, 
physical space, and social distances are hypothesized 
to share common neural substrates, including the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Chiao et al., 2009; 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; Yamakawa, Kanai, 
Matsumura, & Naito, 2009). Indeed, directly 
comparing brain regions involved in judgments of 
physical and social distances reveals overlapping 
activity in this region of the parietal cortex (Yamakawa 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the superior parietal lobule 
(SPL), a parietal brain region adjacent to the IPS, has 
been found to be involved in egocentric 
representations of spatial information relating external 
objects to the self (Naito et al., 2008; Neggers, Van 
der Lubbe, Ramsey, & Postma, 2006). Such findings 
suggest that the perception of self-referential distance 
may recruit various areas of the parietal cortex. 
In the social domain, the IPS has been shown 
to be responsive to information conveying the social 
status of others (Chiao et al., 2009; Cloutier et al., 
2012; Zink et al., 2008). In one such study, viewing 
higher status individuals preferentially activated the 
right inferior parietal cortex (Zink et al., 2008). In 
another study, where participants were asked to 
explicitly compare the social status of individuals (i.e. 
military rank) (Chiao et al., 2009), increased IPS 
activity was found for judgments based on pairs of 
military individuals closer in ranks; a similar effect was 
obtained with numerical comparisons. Echoing the 
findings of Zink and colleagues, a recent study 
(Cloutier et al., 2012) found that social targets paired 
with higher financial status, as denoted by salary 
information, elicited preferential activity in the right IPS 
of perceivers (who themselves had relatively low 
financial status).  
Although there is increasing evidence 
suggesting that the IPS is involved in computing or 
representing social distances between the relative 
social status of targets, to our knowledge, no studies 
have explored how explicit self-referential judgments 
of other’s social status may modulate IPS activity. 
Accordingly, building on previous attempts to 
investigate the impact of social status on the neural 
substrates of person perception (Cloutier et al., 2012), 
the current event-related design fMRI experiment was 
designed to uncover the impact of explicit self-
referential financial and moral status judgments on 
IPS activity. Furthermore, in contrast to previous 
studies using various forms of person-knowledge to 
convey status (Chiao, et al., 2009; Cloutier et al., 
2012; Zink et al., 2008), the current study explicitly 
assigned distinct levels (Low, Average and High) and 
types (Moral and Financial) of social status to the 
targets. This approach ensured that targets were not 
characterized by person-knowledge other than their 
social status. Based on past research, we expected to 
find differences in IPS activity as a function of the self-
relevance of the judgments provided by perceivers, 
such that targets of equal status level would be 
associated with greater IPS activity.  
 
 
 
2.1. Participants 
Eighteen male participants between the ages 
of 19 and 31 (mean age=23.8) were recruited from the 
greater Chicago area. Two participants were excluded 
due to excessive head movement during scanning, 
and 3 were excluded due to failure to comply with the 
task requirements. Analyses were performed on the 
remaining thirteen participants. All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision and none 
reported significant abnormal neurological history. 
Participants were paid $50 for their participation and 
gave informed consent in accordance with the 
guidelines set by the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Institutional Review Board at the University of 
Chicago.  
 
2.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants first answered a series of 
questionnaires including fMRI pre-screening material, 
demographic information, and measures of objective 
and subjective status. Subjective measures of 
financial and moral status were modifications of the 
ladder scale extensively used and validated to 
evaluate subjective socio-economic status (SES) 
(Adler et al., 2000; Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 
2003; Singh-Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005), and it 
assessed the participants’ subjective financial and 
moral status amongst the university undergraduate 
population of the greater Chicago area. Participants 
were informed that their status ostensibly fell in the 
middle of the distribution of the social status of other 
participants in the study. Importantly, participants were 
told that the distribution of the financial and moral 
status of participants was not necessarily 
representative of the distribution of the student 
population of the greater Chicago area. This allowed 
for the subsequent presentation of social targets with 
higher, equal, or lower financial and moral status.  
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Participants completed a computer-based 
training task (adapted from Cloutier, Norman, Li, & 
Berntson, 2013) to learn the association between 
colors (Blue and Red) and specific social status types 
(Financial and Moral). Shades of each color (Darker, 
Medium, and Lighter) were associated with different 
levels of social status (High, Average, and Low). For 
example, light blue may indicate high moral status 
whereas dark red may indicate low financial status 
(the association between color and status was 
counterbalanced across participants). During 
encoding, participants were presented with the 
backgrounds of the different shades (without any 
faces) with a text box indicating the social status type 
and level with which the shade of each color was 
paired. 70 trials were presented for each of the six 
conditions. The status types and levels associated 
with the backgrounds were counterbalanced across 
participants (i.e., Red or Blue indicating Financial or 
Moral status and darker shades indicating either 
Higher or Lower status). Following the encoding 
phase, the participants took part in a testing phase 
during which they were required to accurately identify 
at least 30 sequential presentations of the 
backgrounds with the correct status level and type. 
Participants were informed that they would later be 
presented with faces paired with these color 
backgrounds and were reminded that these 
individuals would also be participants in the study to 
emphasize the fact that they belonged to the same 
group. 
Following an initial fMRI session which 
involved forming impressions of the stimuli 
superimposed on the colored background, participants 
took part in an event-related design fMRI session 
during which they were presented with all targets 
paired with the colored backgrounds and asked to 
explicitly identify the status of the targets in relation to 
their own (see Figure 1). The stimuli were composed 
of 30 color photographs of white males, ostensibly 
from the same participant pool from which participants 
were recruited. The face stimuli were of college age 
males (approximately 18-25 years old) who displayed 
neutral facial expression and wore gray shirts. Stimuli 
were presented with E-prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) using a back-
projection system. The event-related session 
consisted of 6 runs. During each run, participants 
were presented with five faces from each status 
condition, for a total of 180 trials (30 in each run). 
Each face was paired with a color, presented against 
a black background, and remained on the screen for 
2000 ms. Faces were followed by a centrally 
presented white crosshair against a black background 
for 500 ms. Stimulus presentation was jittered with a 
mean ITI of 6000 ms (range = 3000 to 9000 ms). 
Participants were instructed to indicate via button 
press the status of the target in relation to their own 
(Lower, Equal, or Higher). Once the fMRI session 
ended, participants were asked to fill out additional 
questionnaires and took part in a short computer-
based task as part of a larger project. They were 
asked to provide ratings of all the targets presented 
during the scanning session. Among these ratings, 
judgments of similarity were relevant to the current 
project.  
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Schematic representation of stimulus presentation during the self-referential status judgment task. In an event-related fMRI 
session, participants were presented with targets paired with colored backgrounds indicative of status types and level and were 
asked to explicitly identify the status of the targets in relation to their own. 
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2.3. fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
MRI was performed on a 3 T Philips Achieva 
Quasar scanner at the University of Chicago Brain 
Research Imaging Center. The fMRI pulse sequence 
parameters include time repetition/time echo (TR/TE) 
3000/25 ms, flip angle = 85°, contiguous slices with 3 
mm thickness, gap 0.3 mm, 212 × 212 mm field of 
view (FOV), approximately 72 × 70 matrix. High 
resolution structural images were acquired in the 
sagittal plane using a T1-weighted 3D Turbo Field 
Echo (TFE/MP-RAGE) anatomical scan with the 
following parameters: TR = 8.5 ms, TE = 4.0 ms, FOV 
= 240 × 228 mm, 1.0 mm slice thickness, no gap, 240 
× 228 mm matrix, 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm voxel size.  
fMRI data were analyzed by using the general 
linear model (GLM) for event-related designs in SPM8 
(Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London, UK). For each functional run, data were 
preprocessed to remove sources of noise and artifact. 
Images were realigned within and across runs via a 
rigid body transformation in order to correct for head 
movement. Images were then unwarped to reduce 
residual movement-related image distortions not 
corrected by realignment. Functional data were 
normalized into a standard stereotaxic space (3 mm 
isotropic voxels) based on the SPM8 echo planar 
imaging template that conforms to the ICBM 152 brain 
template space (Montreal Neurological Institute) and 
approximates the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas 
space. Finally, normalized images were spatially 
smoothed (8-mm full-width at half-maximum) using a 
Gaussian kernel to increase the signal to noise ratio 
and to reduce the impact of anatomical variability not 
corrected for by stereotaxic normalization. 
For each participant, a GLM was constructed 
to investigate status condition specific brain activity. 
This GLM, incorporating task effects and covariates of 
no interest (a session mean, a linear trend to account 
for low-frequency drift, and 6 movement parameters 
derived from realignment corrections), was convolved 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF) and used to compute parameter estimates (β) 
and contrast images (containing weighted parameter 
estimates) for each status condition at each voxel. 
The six condition onsets were based on the 
participants’ explicit self-referential judgments of the 
targets varying in status level (Lower, Equal, and 
Higher) and types (Financial and Moral).   
The data were subjected to an exploratory 
whole brain analysis, where the contrast images from 
each condition were compared to baseline (a fixation 
control condition). These images were used to 
compute a whole brain voxelwise ANOVA, yielding F-
statistical maps for the status level main effect, the 
status type main effect, and the interaction between 
status level and status type. 
Finally, a region of interest (ROI) analysis was 
conducted to identify a potential dissociation in IPS 
responses to social targets varying on levels of 
financial and moral status. The eight millimeters 
spherical IPS ROI (MNI: 48, -62, 46) was based on 
coordinates taken from a previous study of the impact 
of social status on person perception (Cloutier et al., 
2012). Parameter estimates for each condition were 
extracted and submitted to an offline 2 (Status Type: 
Financial, Moral) by 3 (Status Level: Lower, Equal, 
Higher) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  
 
 
 
3.1. Behavioral results  
On average, participants reported possessing 
a higher moral subjective status (M=7.15, SD=1.21) 
than financial subjective status (M=4.38, SD=2.78), 
t(12)=2.899, p=0.013, η2 =0.411. 
Participants’ responses during the self-
referential fMRI task were used to generate the onsets 
in the current study. Their responses indicated that, on 
average, participants judged Financial status targets 
as having relatively lower status 25.84 times 
(SD=6.03), equal status 36.38 times (SD=8.57), and 
higher status 26.61 times  (SD=9.63). Similarly, 
participants’ responses indicated that on average they 
judged Moral status targets as having relatively lower 
status 24.30 times (SD=7.81), equal status 41.84 
times (SD=11.83), and higher status 22.46 times  
(SD=8.52). 
A 2 (Status Type: Financial, Moral) by 3 
(Status Level: Low, Average, High) repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed on post-scan 
similarity ratings of the faces. There was no main 
effect of status type, F(1,12)=0.10, p=0.924, η2=0.001, 
and no significant status type by status level 
interaction, F(2,24)=0.894, p=0.422, η2=0.069, was 
observed. However, a significant Status Level main 
effect, F(2,24)=3.872, p=0.035, η2=0.244 revealed that 
participants rated targets of Average status as more 
similar to themselves (M=3.85, SD=0.738) than Lower 
moral status targets(M=3.26, SD=0.529), t(12)=-2.49, 
p=0.028, η2 =0.340. 
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3.2. Brain imaging results 
Exploratory whole-brain analysis. A whole-brain 
exploratory analysis of variance was performed to 
identify additional brain regions differentially recruited 
by social targets varying in social status. The results 
indicated a significant interaction of IPS activity in 
response to targets differing in types and levels of 
social status (see Table 1 and Figure 3). Additionally, 
temporal and parietal areas were revealed in the 
interaction of status type by status level. This 
concurrent brain activity may reflect operations related 
to the computation of egocentric representations of 
socially salient stimuli (Naito et al., 2008; Neggers et 
al., 2006) or the involvement of attention networks 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Klein, Shepherd, & Platt, 2009; Posner & 
Rothbart, 2007; Raz & Buhle, 2006). Conceivably, 
such processes could operate in support of relative 
social distance judgments (Chiao, et al., 2009; 
Cloutier et al., 2012; Yamakawa et al., 2009) 
 
Table1. Exploratory Whole Brain Analyses. MNI Coordinates are reported at an uncorrected threshold of p <0.005 with extend 
clusters of 5 voxels. 
 
BA Brain Region P K F x y Z 
Status Type by Status Level Interaction 
BA 17 L Lingual Gyrus 0.000 102 12.03 -12 -93 -6 
BA 40 R Intraparietal Sulcus 0.000 70 10.32 54 -51 39 
BA 20 R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0.001 22 9.36 51 -9 -42 
BA 38 R Superior Temporal Gyrus  0.001 12 8.99 48 6 -24 
BA 20 L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0.001 21 8.85 -60 -24 -21 
 
L Thalamus 0.001 10 8.75 -9 -15 0 
BA 9 R Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 0.002 13 7.60 6 42 -15 
BA 2 L Postcentral Gyrus 0.002 6 7.46 -54 -27 36 
BA 19 L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 0.002 7 7.30 -33 -81 -6 
Status Type Main Effect 
BA 18 R Lingual Gyrus 0.000 2184 47.02 15 -93 -3 
BA 32 L Anterior Cingulate 0.000 65 32.09 -15 51 -3 
BA 31 R Anterior Cingulate 0.000 9 20.77 12 -27 51 
BA 6 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 0.000 21 19.96 9 6 63 
 
R Cerebellum  0.000 21 19.96 15 -63 -36 
BA 21 R Post. Sup. Temporal Sulcus 0.001 30 18.12 54 -45 9 
BA 4 R Precentral Gyrus 0.001 12 16.12 42 -12 57 
BA 36 R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0.002 5 12.78 30 -6 -39 
BA 20 L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0.003 6 12.31 -48 -33 -24 
BA 31 R Precuneus 0.003 5 12.26 12 -66 36 
Status Level Main Effect 
BA 18 L Middle Occipital Gyrus 0.000 918 24.63 -24 -96 15 
BA 23 L Caudate 0.000 68 12.37 -18 24 0 
BA 22 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 0.001 9 9.39 54 0 3 
BA 3 L Postcentral Gyrus 0.001 48 9.23 -39 -21 51 
BA 32 R Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 0.001 48 8.69 3 36 -12 
BA 21 L Superior Temporal Gyrus 0.001 11 8.42 -66 -42 3 
BA 4 L Precentral Gyrus 0.001 43 8.25 -33 -27 63 
BA 24 L Middle Cingular Gyrus 0.001 117 7.96 -9 0 42 
BA 1 R Postcentral Gyrus 0.001 117 7.96 51 -18 45 
 
L Cerebellum 0.002 15 7.71 -27 -45 -24 
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Figure 3. 
 
Graphical displays of signal change (parameter estimates) 
provided to interpret the results of the whole brain analysis. Panel 
1: interaction between Status Level and Status Type; Panel 2: 
main effect of Status Type; Panel 3: main effect of Status Level.  
ROI Analyses. A 2 (Status Type: Financial, Moral) by 
3 (Status Level: Lower, Equal, Higher) repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed on parameter 
estimates extracted from an IPS ROI used in previous 
studies (Chiao et al., 2009; Cloutier et al., 2012). No 
main effect of status type, F(1,12)=0.449, p=0.516, 
η2=0.036, or Status Level F(2,24)=0.099, p=0.906, 
η2=0.008 were obtained, but, once again, a significant 
status type by status level interaction, F(2,24)=3.576, 
p=0.044, η2=0.230, was observed. Although 
subsequent comparisons trended in the right direction 
(Cloutier et al., 2012)  [(Lower vs. Higher moral status: 
t(12) > -1.854, p=0.088), (Lower vs. Higher financial 
status: t(12)=1.577, p=0.141, η2=0.170)], additional 
analysis only revealed significantly less IPS activity to 
Lower (M=-0.435, SD=0.771) compared to Equal (M=-
0.114, SD=0.656) Moral Status Targets, t(12)=-2.200, 
p=0.048, η2=0.287 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. 
 
Sagittal section (left) illustrating the spherical ROI in IPS 
hypothesized to support the assessment of the relative social 
status of others. The graph to the right of the image displays signal 
change (parameter estimates) for each trial type (Lower, Equal, 
and Higher Financial and Moral Status) for this brain region. 
Inspection of these figures reveals an interaction between status 
types and levels. 
 
 
 
The current study presents further evidence of 
the differential involvement of IPS during the 
perception of others varying in social status. The 
obtained results suggest more IPS activity in response 
to targets of equal and higher moral status relative to 
those with lower moral status, whereas a reversed 
trend was observed in response to different levels of 
financial status (with relatively greater response to 
lower financial status targets). Greater IPS activity 
may occur in response to social targets deemed to be 
“socially closer” to the self (Chiao et al., 2009; 
Yamakawa et al., 2009), however the limited 
behavioral evidence available prevent from drawing 
strong conclusions in that regard. This interpretation 
would nonetheless be in line with results from a 
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previous study demonstrating greater IPS activity 
when perceivers were presented with targets closer in 
military ranks (Chiao et al., 2009) or with targets with a 
financial status similar to their own (Cloutier et al., 
2012).  
Contrary to the arguments for a domain-
specific role related to number processing operations 
(Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; 
Pinel et al., 2001; Pinel et al., 2004), the current data 
provide additional evidence of the region’s sensitivity 
to the social status of others (Chiao et al., 2009; 
Cloutier et a., 2012; Zink et al., 2008). This suggests 
that the IPS may support domain-general operations 
(Shuman & Kanwisher, 2004) recruited when 
perceivers engage in implicit or explicit discriminations 
across a variety of social and non-social targets. 
Accordingly, the IPS may subserve critical functions 
as a part of a greater person perception network. 
Within such network, the IPS might be involved in 
assessing the relative positions of individuals 
comprising a given social hierarchy. Such cognitive 
mapping of relative social standing may guide 
subsequent behavior towards successful interactions 
with members of the group (Frith & Wolpert, 2004; 
Goleman, 2006). This process could represent an 
essential component of the creation and maintenance 
of social hierarchies (Cummins, 2000; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008), and support various forms of social 
comparison processes (Festinger, 1954; Wheeler, 
1966).  
Interestingly, a whole-brain analysis revealed 
that areas of the VMPFC were responsive when 
perceivers judged targets as possessing equal social 
status (see Table 1 and Figure 3). These results are in 
line with previous research demonstrating VMPFC 
involvement in self-referential processing (Gusnard, 
Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Johnson et al., 
2002; Kelley et al, 2002; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, 
Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). However, a region of the 
VMPFC was also previously found to be responsive to 
social status information (Cloutier et al., 2012). 
Additional research will be needed to further clarify the 
role of different VMPFC areas potentially supporting 
person evaluation and self-referential processing 
(Cloutier et al., 2012; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; 
Mitchell et al., 2006). 
In addition to its involvement in assessing 
social distances, it is worth considering that the IPS 
may function as part of greater attention networks 
involving a number of parietal, temporal, and 
prefrontal brain areas (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Klein, Shepherd, & Platt, 
2009; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Raz & Buhle, 2006). 
Such networks of brain regions could be recruited 
when encountering socially salient stimuli, in this case 
based on the social status paired with the faces. In 
light of recent evidence demonstrating that perceivers 
pay differential attention to targets varying in social 
status (Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & Galfano, 2012; 
Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005; Fiske, 2010; Foulsham, 
Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010; Maner, 
DeWall, & Gailliot, 2008), further research should 
explore this potential IPS function in the context of 
person perception tasks. 
Surprisingly, few empirical accounts have 
shed light on the influence of social status on the so-
called “social brain” (Chiao, 2010; Kumaran, Melo, & 
Duzel, 2012; Marsh, Blair, Jones, Soliman, & Blair, 
2009). The current study, along with other recent 
reports (Cloutier et al., 2012), demonstrates the need 
to consider the impact of distinct status types, in 
addition to levels of status, to better understand how 
social cognition is shaped by social hierarchies (Fiske, 
2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In addition to 
financial and moral status, physical dominance and 
intellectual aptitudes may be salient types along which 
perceivers infer status (Marsh et al., 2009; Stephens 
et al., 2007). Examining IPS involvement in response 
to these diverse status types may provide further 
insights into how social distances are computed within 
hierarchies. It may be the case that social distances 
are “mapped” based on measurable and concrete 
attributes, such as physical strength or finances, 
differently than for more abstract attributes, such as 
intellect or morality. For instance, whereas individuals 
may have a tendency to inflate their subjective 
assessment of moral status, it may be more difficult to 
do so for financial status.  
Given that social status can often be inferred 
from perceptually available characteristics, such as 
age, gender, race, attractiveness, and dominance 
(Fiske, 2010; Freeman, Penner, Saperstein, Scheutz, 
& Ambady, 2011; Karafin, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2004; 
Marsh et al., 2009), it remains important to expand 
current efforts by examining how such perceptual 
cues may influence the perception of targets varying 
on levels of status across multiple social types. In 
addition to possessing knowledge of others actual 
status within a group (e.g., a higher rank in the 
military), the status typically associated with 
perceptually available characteristics (e.g., gender or 
race) may impact the assessment of social distances 
among the members of a particular hierarchy. 
Although in the expected direction, and unlike 
what was previously found (Cloutier et al., 2012), no 
significant difference in IPS activity was identified in 
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response to targets varying in financial status. It may 
be the case that morality was a more relevant 
dimension to participants of the current study who 
generally perceived themselves as possessing higher 
moral than financial status. It is possible that college 
students are less sensitive to information about 
financial compared to moral status. Nonetheless, the 
absence of significant IPS activity in responses to 
targets varying in financial status is likely due to the 
relatively small sample size available. Future research 
should address this issue by studying populations with 
adequate distribution of distinct levels of Financial and 
Moral status types.  
Unlike previous studies (Chiao et al., 2009; 
Cloutier et al., 2012; Zink et al., 2008), the current 
study also involved status inferred from social types 
that are not easily quantifiable by participants. This is 
noteworthy because the IPS has often been presented 
as a region dedicated to number processing (Cohen-
Kadosh et al., 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; Pinel et al., 
2001; Pinel et al., 2004). Whereas military ranks 
(Chiao et al., 2009) or salary information (Cloutier et 
al., 2012) may easily be construed numerically, it may 
be more difficult to do so with levels of moral status. 
However, by assigning Low, Average, and High levels 
of status to the targets, perceivers may still have co-
opted representations of magnitude associated with 
numerical cognition to establish the relative ranks of 
the targets. 
The current project, along with previous 
research (Chiao et al., 2009; Cloutier et al., 2012; Zink 
et al., 2008), suggests that being aware of others’ 
social status in relation to one’s own modulates 
activity in the IPS. Although the current findings 
suggest that the IPS is sensitive to information about 
the social status of others, more efforts are needed to 
understand the region’s involvement in person 
perception and attention brain networks. To achieve 
this goal, it will be useful to examine how IPS activity 
relates to other brain regions implicated in person 
perception. For instance, it may be beneficial to 
investigate how the perception of social distances 
relates to processes supporting person evaluation. 
Ultimately, these efforts should reveal the complex 
mechanisms underlying social interactions within 
hierarchies and their neural underpinnings.  
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